War Powers And The Logic Of Congressional Action

The war powers debate that has occupied so much public attention in the decades following Vietnam has typically portrayed the Congress and the president engaged in a continuous constitutional struggle over institutional prerogatives. Although the war powers literature presents many explanations of why Congress has not been able to effectively control presidential war making, most studies seem to take one thing for granted: that Congress is motivated by a desire to do so. The present study challenges this central assumption and introduces a new methodology to examine congressional behavior during consideration of the Multinational Force in Lebanon Resolution (1983) and the Authorization for the Use of Military Force Against Iraq Resolution (1991). Using Douglas Arnold's Logic of Congressional Action as a model, the researcher conducts a content analysis of congressional floor debate to determine if members of Congress are also motivated by electoral calculations when deciding matters of war and peace. The results indicate that in fact, members do seem to be motivated by electoral forces. Furthermore, the study reveals that content analysis can be a useful tool that holds the potential to make a significant contribution to both the war powers literature and to models of congressional action.