Theories Of Harm For Digital Mergers Note By Brazil

Mergers in the rapidly changing digital economy raise competition concerns. The fast growth of the number of these mergers has raised global concerns about whether they will escape notice due to legal notification thresholds, and whether current substantive assessments adequately address their unique competitive risks. This article examines these challenges, focusing on Brazil's antitrust agency (CADE) and its use of the merger review framework of Law 12529/2011. It examines current debates and proposes new theories of harm from digital horizontal, vertical, and conglomerate mergers, which include data-driven foreclosure or increased access to competitively sensitive information, the interaction between privacy and antitrust, and the potential harms of digital ecosystems. The paper draws lessons from CADE's recent case law to improve antitrust analysis and emphasizes the need to incorporate new theories of harm to make merger control more responsive to potential new forms of economic power abuse in the digital economy.